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To Readers: The argument is, I fancy, complete, but some details in footnotes 
and references, and occasionally matters of routine calculation in the main 
body, need to be cleaned up.
Abstract:  “Commercialization” and “monetization” dance with stage theories from Smith to 
modern growth theory.  The sheer growth of traded or the sheer growth of money, though, do not 
an Industrial Revolution make.  The ill-named “Price Revolution,” for example, came from 
American gold, not from population increases, and did not inspire innovation. 
Commercialization comes from falling transaction costs, which should be directly studied. 
Fernand Braudel, however, argued for commercialization as a force transforming “capitalism.” 
He distinguished “capitalism” from local trade, which no economist would, and assigned blame 
to the capitalists.  Though hardly a Marxist, he---like a brilliant group of leftish economists such 
as Marglin and Lazonick---puts emphasis on the struggle over the spoils.  But it was not such 
struggles that made the modern world.  It was the positive sum arising from innovation.
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Chapter 22:
It was Not the Sheer Quickening of Commerce
A perennial candidate for The Cause is “commercialization” and its 
doppelganger “monetization.”  The words dance with stage theories, such as Smith’s 
or Marx’s, or with modernization theory’s like Weber’s or Simmel’s, or now with 
the neo-stage theories of the economists’ growth theory.  Like the rising middle 
class, the scope of commerce and money is always supposed to be rising, almost 
regardless of the period of prosperity considered.  An economic historian, though, 
can tell you that the European economy, like the Greek or the Chinese or the 
Egyptian, has always been ”monetized.”  The calculative bent that is supposed to 
have arisen recently was in fact characteristic of all the mercantile or bureaucratic 
civilizations, that is, all cultures engaging in trade or taxation, at any rate among 
the traders, tax collectors, and temple priests themselves (admittedly, the extension 
of a quantitative rhetoric to ordinary people, not already merchants, was a 
characteristic part of the Bourgeois Revaluation).  You can see thoroughly 
monetized thinking in Walter of Henley’s treatise on estate management in the late 
thirteenth century as much as in courses on financial accounting at the Henley 
Business School in the early twenty-first century.  The accounting is less 
sophisticated earlier, but among economic sophisticates early and late the counting 
in money ruled.  In the European Middle Ages one could buy almost anything for 
cash—a husband, a marketplace, a kingdom, pardon for crimes, fewer years in 
purgatory.  “But with these relics,” says Chaucer of the Pardoner selling papal 
indulgences, “when he found/ A poor person dwelling on the land/ Within a day 
he got out of him more money/ Than the person got himself in two months.”1  In 
West African kingdoms in the seventeenth century, as in seventeenth-century 
Virginia, people were for sale.  Buyers and sellers in all ages thought in terms of 
money, and there have always been buyers and sellers.
Somewhat surprisingly viewed from outside economics, an economist will tell 
you, therefore, that the history of money is not the same thing as the history of prosperity, 
and has nothing to do with industrialization.  Non-economist historians suppose for 
example that a new industrial economy must have arisen from Spanish silver flowing 
into Europe and China in the so-called Price Revolution (whose rate of inflation, by the 
way, was a mere 2 percent a year: some “revolution”—during the 1970s and 1980s 
worldwide inflation was 8 percent per year, which meant that a doubling of the price 
level happened in one fourth of the time it took in the sixteenth century).  After all, a 
commercial economy is about money, isn’t it?  And surely the Price Revolution caused 
falling real wages, and therefore higher profits for proto-capitalists, because “wages 
always lag behind prices.”  And indeed the Price Revolution itself must have been caused 
by rising population, which drove up food prices?  
1  Chaucer, “General Prologue” to The Canterbury Tales, ll. 701-704.
The economist replies gently to all these indignant questions: no, dear.  In her view
—admitting its strangeness, though affirming its truth—the form and volume of money is 
largely irrelevant to deeper economic currents.  Money, the economist says, is a veil. 
What matters for real enrichment, she continues, are real, not monetary, magnitudes: real 
output, real wages, relative prices, real innovations in the way things are made.  We eat 
pounds of meat, not dollars worths.  If the price of meat increases by a factor of four, as it 
did in the truly great inflation of the 1970s and 1980s (the fastest worldwide in history, 
putting ancient and early modern inflations in the shade) we are startled if we keep 
remembering prices back in the good old days.  We are sticker shocked.  But if meanwhile 
our money incomes have increased also by a factor of four, then in truth we are no worse 
off.  We get the same poundage of meat for the same sacrifice of hours of work or checks 
from our pensions.  
It is often alleged that the Price Revolution was caused by increasing population. 
“No,” says the economist, now vexed, “for Lord’s sake, no!”  To be sure, population 
growth in Europe during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries made labor less valuable 
relative to land, which is why real wages fell.  You can visualize it as more agricultural 
workers showing up at the farmer’s gate in the morning looking for work.  He says, “All 
right.  I’ll take more of you, but will set you to work doing less urgent tasks at lower 
wages relative to the price of the barley that I sell.  Ned, we’ll do some additional 
harrowing on the Church Field.  John, go chase the crows away from the Nether Field.” 
The technique of making things did not improve.  On account of the falling price of labor 
relative to land the economy used a different recipe.  Labor substituted for land.  More 
labor on the acreage was the right recipe for a newly labor-rich economy.  But was not 
itself an innovation in the book of recipes—not clover in the fields (Holland and East 
Anglia in 1300), not mechanical harvesting (Illinois in the 1830s), not hybrid corn (Iowa in 
the 1950s).  
Yet the amount of silver and gold money had nothing to do with the falling ratios 
of money wages to money prices, which is the falling real wage.  There were shillings on 
both sides, which cancel out.  Rising population did cause the real price of grain to rise, 
but a rising relative price of grain, one commodity among many, and a land-intensive 
one, would not be the cause of the Price Revolution.2  When the otherwise very insightful 
Joyce Oldham Appleby casually mentions the sixteenth century’s “inflation caused by 
high food prices” the economist grits her teeth.3  Relative prices, the economist argues, 
have nothing to do with absolute, money prices.  One could equally well argue that if 
population had instead declined, and the price of labor-intensive goods like cloth had 
therefore risen relative to grain, then that would have caused an “inflation.”  So, in such a 
fractured logic, everything causes inflation.  Every change in relative prices, wheat against 
cloth, up or down, makes prices in general relative to silver higher.  Evidently something 
is wrong.  The reductio shows that using relative prices to talk about general inflation is 
not possible.  (Admittedly, the talk is common in fact: even some economists think that a 
2   I have not been able to persuade over a few decades of trying the otherwise very canny Jack 
Goldstone, as in Goldstone 2002a: “The combination of sustained population growth since the 
fading of the plague circa 1450, plus a vast infusion of silver, have combined to raise prices in a 
dizzying spiral; taxes have not kept pace, weakening these regimes.”  The population growth 
would have lowered prices, not increased them.  And the “dizzying spiral,” I have noted, was a 
mere 2 percent per year, hardly fast enough to make it even mildly difficult for taxes or rents to 
“keep pace.”  Something growing at 2 percent takes fully 36 years to double.
3  Appleby 1978, p. 27.
rise in, say, oil prices relative to bricks is especially inflationary.  Talk of a “core” rate of 
inflation is of this character, embodied in official if illogical declarations monthly from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics4.)  
In fact rising population in the sixteenth century, supposing for a moment that it 
was all that happened (there was after all that notable rise in the amount of silver and 
gold from the New World, and silver from Central European mines, and debasements of 
coinage by needy governments at the same time), would have forced an existing stock of 
silver and gold to do more work in transactions.  The only way that could be 
accomplished is by reducing the amount of money needed to buy bread—a great 
deflation, not an inflation.5  If population is supposed to be the driving force it would 
have driven prices not up, but down.
   *      *      *      *
And for some of the same reasons the economist is suspicious of the story of 
“monetization.” As in the stories of foreign trade or stories of environmental disaster or 
stories of institutions of property rights, the story gets part of its plausibility from 
imagining a world bereft.  Suppose we had no trade?  Suppose we had no trees?  Suppose 
we had no means of effecting a deal?  Suppose we had no private property?  But in all 
cases the relevant historical question is what would happen with a little more or less 
4   For the argument against “core” inflation see Ritholtz 2007, and for a defense of it DeLong 2007. 
DeLong argues that food and fuel prices typically have fluctuations that are “self-correcting,” and 
therefore should not be the object of monetary policy.  One wonders why other relative prices are 
not also self-correcting.
5  McCloskey 1972b.
foreign trade, or trees, or means of payment, or property rights.  The answer in the case of 
“monetization” is that it seems implausible on its face that highly advantageous trades 
were made impossible by an absence merely of a convenient and modern-looking means 
of payment, such as stably supported pounds sterling, or Spanish coins.  The economic 
logic is that when an advantageous deal is to be made between a peasant offering wheat 
or rice and a town-dweller offering pottery or cloth, both sides have a large incentive to 
make it happen, somehow.  In historical fact they figure out some way to make the 
payment—in iron bars, say, or cowry shells, or cloth itself, or rice itself.  The abundance 
and therefore the convenience of a means of payment is a secondary matter.  It matters, 
but not much.  If copper or cowry shells are rare, their relative price goes up, which is to 
say that deflation occurs.  So what?  The deals still get made.  To put the point in 
economic jargon, the means of payment is endogenous, generated by economic forces 
internal to the deals made.  “Monetization” is not some manna dropping from the skies to 
nourish baby capitalists.
True, commerce expanded.  The quarrel is with the common view that 
“commercialization” is some force outside the deal-making of individuals.  The historian 
of China Peter Perdue, for example, speaks of “monetization” and “commercialization” 
of the Ming and then the Xing economy.6  What such an expansion means, however, is 
that more deals were made.  The desire to make deals did not change, as Perdue on 
reflection would certainly affirm.  What changed was the ease of making them—and as I 
said that is normally a secondary consideration.  As Weber put it, recall, “the impulse to 
6  Perdue 2005, p. 560.
acquisition, pursuit of gain, of money, of the greatest possible amount of money, . . . has 
been common to all sorts and conditions of men at all times and in all countries of the 
earth, wherever the objective possibility of it is or has been given."  What changed were 
“transaction costs,” in the phrase of the great economist Ronald Coase (1910-   ), that is, 
the costs of getting together to make a deal—transportation costs, the costs of robbers on 
the highway or in the market, the costs of trust, the costs of insurance, the costs of using 
credit, the costs of getting coins and bills, the costs of negotiation, the costs of taboo, the 
costs of sneering at the bourgeoisie.  All these make deals more expensive, and many of 
them are directly measurable.  When such costs fall, “commercialization” takes place. 
What the economist and historian Douglass North got right (amongst a good deal that he 
got wrong) is that we should focus on the history of the transactions costs—about which 
there is ample documentation—and cease believing that there is something separately 
measurable “spreading” to make people and their taxing governments rich, called 
“commercialization” or “monetization” (neither of which, by the way, are technical terms 
in economics, though they sound like they are).  That’s what wrong with the way most 
historians think about the matter.
What’s wrong with the way most economists think about the same matter comes 
from a different intellectual taste.  Economists want the modern world to come out of the 
expansion of what they understand, commerce.  Modern growth theorists in particular 
are entranced by endogenous theories in which growth leads to growth.  Voila!  No need 
for culture or history.  A recent example among scores of such hopeful arguments is 
provided by Klaus Desmet and Stephen Parente, “The Evolution of Markets and the 
Revolution of Industry: A Quantitative Model of England's Development, 1300-2000.” 
They write: 
This paper argues that an economy's transition from Malthusian stagnation to 
modern growth requires markets to reach a critical size, and competition to reach a 
critical level of intensity.  By allowing an economy to produce a greater variety of 
goods, a larger market makes goods more substitutable, raising the price elasticity 
of demand, and lowering mark-ups.  Firms must then become larger to break even, 
which facilitates amortizing the fixed costs of innovation.  We demonstrate our 
theory in a dynamic general equilibrium model calibrated to England's long-run 
development and explore how various factors affect the timing of takeoff.7
If you like this sort of thing, I can supply you with the names of dozens of economics 
journals devoted to it.  The trouble is that the largest markets in the world 1300-1700—
which is the relevant era for the beginning of all this—with the largest critical size and the 
greatest variety of goods and lowest markups and the highest amortization of the costs of 
innovation—were in China and India and points a little east and west of the Indian 
Ocean.  The smallest markets in the Eurasia were European.  And the expanding markets 
1700-2000 were world-wide, not English.  And yet England alone started it.
      
*       *        *       *
Fernand Braudel's astonishing product of his old age, “Civilization and 
Capitalism, 15th-18th Century,” and especially volume 2, The Wheels of Commerce, is the 
7  Desmet and Parente 2009, abstract.
most full exposition of the idea by a historian that the modern world came naturally out 
the sheer expansion of commerce.  Throughout Wheels Braudel admires markets, yet 
disdains people he calls "capitalists."  It gradually becomes clear that what he means by a 
"market" is the routine provisioning of a society.  One goes to the Noorderkerk market on 
Saturday in Amsterdam expecting to buy cheese or broccoli for a little less than what is 
charged by the two Albert Hijn supermarkets nearby.  One does not expect enormous 
savings, and neither do the stall owners expect enormous profits.  The provisioning is 
routine, and the profits as Alfred Marshall put it in Principles of Economics (1890) are 
"normal."
Braudel argues that peddlers 1100-1789 slowly become shop keepers and that the 
merchant fairs such as Champagne's slowly became warehousing entrepôts like Genoa or 
Amsterdam.  (A long time ago an American professor of history somewhat uncharitably 
compiled the undergraduates’ exam-time versions of these events: “After a revival of 
infantile commerce slowly creeping into Europe, merchants appeared.  Some were sitters 
and some were drifters.  They roamed from town to town exposing themselves and 
organized big fairies in the countryside.”8)  Such developments, Braudel says, were 
routine matters of population density and the cost of transport.  Before Germany's 
population boomed in the sixteenth century, the economical way to sell ribbons to 
Germans was by peddling, drifting from village to village or farm to farm in the style of 
Oklahoma or Chaucer's wandering merchant.  Denser population of course makes it 
worthwhile for a peddler to settle in town, and become a sitter rather than roaming 
8  Henriksson 1983.
around exposing himself.  The fairs of medieval times developed into the warehouses in 
Amsterdam of early modern times—which were able, Braudel reports, to hold nine years 
worth of Dutch grain consumption, had that been their main use (it was not: it was to 
hold the consumption of grain, lumber, cloth, spices for the next few months of all of the 
lands near the Rhine and the Meuse).  In 1650 an English writer exclaimed about the 
mystery of Dutch success: “The abundance of corn grows in the East Kingdoms [Poland], 
but the great storehouses for grain to serve Christendom and the heathen countries (in 
time of dearth) is in the Low Countries.  The mighty vineyards, and store of salt, is in 
France and Spain, but the great vintage [of casked or bottled wine] and [the] staple 
[marketplace] of salt is in the Low Countries.”9  The warehousers—the great merchants of 
Holland—were able to settle down on the Herengracht, and not dust their feet in twenty 
fairs a year, because the Dutch fluyt, broad of beam and light of crew, cut costs of 
shipping between the Baltic and the North Sea.  Such changes were reversible.  The Thirty 
Years' War cut the population of Germany by a third and the peddlers once more hit the 
road.  Over the longer run the little retail peddlers and the big wholesale merchants 
settled down, and no "capitalist" profit ensued.  
By contrast to the honest cheese vendor by the Noorderkerk, or by contrast for that 
matter to the honest if more fancy and more convenient and more expensive Albert Hijn 
on Haarlemmerdijk, a "capitalist" in Braudel's scheme makes big profits.  The profits are 
abnormal, "quasi-rents" as Marshall called them, the short-run profits before entry brings 
normality back.  Braudel's capitalist makes his quasi-rents by Mafia techniques.  He 
9  John Keymer, quoted in Appleby 1978, pp. 75-76.
corrupts governments.  He organizes monopolies.  To defend his trading post in West 
Africa, his abnormally profitable turf, he is willing to engage in shocking violence, 
shocking at any rate to those who faced European imperial commerce 1500-1960.  He 
eagerly leaps into any new opportunity to buy very low in, say, Batavia in Indonesia of 
Kinshasa in Congo to sell very high, ten times higher, in Amsterdam or Antwerp.  He 
sneers at the suckers who work 9:00 to 5:00 for merely normal profits.  He's a crook, a 
player, a wise guy.  No wonder Braudel doesn't love such a "capitalist."  Who except 
Carmela could love Tony Soprano, really?
Braudel was very far from being a Marxist, at any rate by the standard of, say, his 
contemporary Sartre or of the next generation, such as Louis Althusser.  But like us all he 
imbibed in his youth Marxist ideas about how the economy functioned, ideas echoing 
through followers of Marx like Karl Polanyi or even revisionists of Marx such as Max 
Weber.  You can't avoid Marxist ideas any more than you can avoid Darwinian or 
Freudian ideas.  I can't, either.  They're part of the rhetoric of the age, its commonplaces. 
(Awareness of rhetorical techniques, I think, makes it possible to spot one’s own 
commonplaces, at least sometimes, and to worry about their aptness.  By contrast, if you 
think of language as being merely a system of signs for pre-existing things you overlook 
its persuasive slant.)
Braudel distinguished three levels of economic life, the material at home, the small 
market in the village, and the big market of capitalism worldwide.  The line between the 
small market and the capitalists, he argues, is written in ethics.  The “capitalists” cheat, 
and because they are big-time cheaters they get ennobled rather than hung.  "Mr. 
Moneybags," I’ve noted, was Marx's indignant characterization of such a character.  “The 
triptych I have described,” Braudel wrote in 1977, “—material life, the market economy, 
and the capitalist economy—is still an amazingly valid explanation, even though 
capitalism today has expanded in scope.”10  In quoting this claim the economist Alan 
Heston remarks that “it is a structure of thinking that is rather alien to trends in economic 
research that seek to explain the behavior of households, markets and business firms 
using similar economic models.”11
What Braudel gets wrong because of his marxisant, rise-of-classes rhetoric is his 
claim that there is a line between normal markets and super-normal innovation.  A 
bourgeois economist does not think so.  She does not mean simply that there's no bright 
line.  She means that there's no line at all.  Market participants are capitalists.  You are, for 
example.  True, you don't have Scrooge-McDuck amounts of moneybags to back your 
investment ideas—at any rate until you can with sweet words persuade Scrooge to invest. 
But when you bought your home, or "invested" in a fur coat against the Chicago winter, 
you were engaging in the same activities as the masters of high finance.  Buying low and 
selling high, expecting the capital gain on your condo to finance your retirement in south 
Texas, expecting the fur coat to yield "profits" in warmth over many winters to come, 
runs every market, haut or petit.  
Braudel's vision is of a routine world of normal profits for little people. 
Economists call it the "steady state.”  It is not just normal and steady.  It is stagnant. 
Innovation—the modern innovation that has made us all rich—does not as Braudel 
10   Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capitalism, p. 112, quoted in Heston 2000.
11   Heston 2000.
claims depend on bribery, violence, and cheating.  It depends on Kirzner’s “alertness.” 
That is, it depends on noticing opportunities for super-normal profit (and using them by 
the exercise of internal and external persuasion, a necessary linguistic supplement to 
Kirzner's story).  One can notice that the booming South Loop of Chicago could really use 
a high-end grocery store, such as Fox and Obel.  The opportunity will make Fox and Obel 
great profits in future years, worth as a capital sum now, say, $1,000,000 (I offer the 
advice to Messrs. Fox and Obel gratis; the advice is probably worth about what I am 
charging).  A million dollars is pocket change by the standard of a really big capitalist like 
Donald Trump.  But it is nonetheless innovation, and results, as The Donald's first big 
real-estate project in Manhattan did, in supernormal profit.  At least it will do so until the 
competition wakes up, too, and two or three more high-end grocery stores open in the 
booming South Loop.  
The analogy extends even to the misbehavior that Braudel assigns to the capitalist 
sphere.  The marxisant vision attributes super-normal profit to large capital accumulation 
and to outrageous behavior.  Neither is correct.  On the whole you make a little or big 
fortune by alertness, not by theft, at any rate in a well-ordered community of laws (on 
which North and I and all economists agree: without laws nothing can happen).  True, 
the oil executives granted numerous opportunities to chat up Vice-President Dick Cheney 
when he ran the U.S. government are going to do better, probably, than a local store 
owner complaining to her alderman that the opening of a WalMart will ruin her.  But 
there's no difference in principle—or, adjusting for scale, in practice—between the two 
cases of lobbying.  Alertness, not investment or corruption or monopoly (though 
unhappily these, too, figure), drives a successful economy.  Something happened in the 
rhetorical world of Europe—in Holland during the seventeenth century and later in 
England; in the late eighteenth century Scotland, and the English colonies in North 
America; in the very early nineteenth century in Belgium and France, and so forth—that 
made alertness explode.
On the other hand, Braudel had one important economic argument quite right, 
which some others—Weber, for example—did not.  Namely: routine behavior yields 
routine profits.  Braudel quotes Weber on sobriety and the like, what Weber called 
Protestant behavior—though even Weber admitted that such behavior was praised in 
numerous handbooks of proper business behavior by undoubted Catholics in northern 
Italy two centuries before the Calvinists after Calvin got hold of the idea.  But Braudel 
knows that sobriety and savings and the like does not yield supernormal profits.  
    *      *       *       *
Yet in one respect Braudel is an orthodox marxoid—a rhetoric, admittedly, that he 
shares with most economists and historians.  He believes that the key to innovation is the 
accumulation of profits.  What Herbert Feis, speaking of Britain in the late nineteenth 
century, called a "free financial force" stood ready around 1800, says Braudel, to shift its 
Mafia-style attentions to manufacturing when that rather than long-distance trade in 
spices and china was the place to make supernormal profits.  
We’ve seen that the "original accumulation" part of this way of narrating the birth 
of the modern is unhelpful.  But the other half is unhelpful, too.  It is not—pace Marx—the 
surplus value stored up by Mr. Moneybags (Herr Geldsack) that propels modern 
innovation.  Such profit is merely a hope tempting to the imagination.  Profit comes 
mostly from productivity, not as the pessimists of the left and right insist mostly from 
monopoly.  Paul Sweezy, Paul Baran, Stephen Marglin, William Lazonick, Bernard 
Elbaum, Edward Lorenz, Jon Cohen, Robert Allen, and other economic scholars on the 
left—an astonishing group, by the way, presenting a scientific challenge largely ignored 
by the Samuelsonian/ Friedmanian orthodoxy in modern economics—have been 
claiming for a long time that innovation was determined by the struggle over the spoils 
(in a phrase, by monopoly capitalism), for good [Galbraith, Lazonick] or evil [Baran and 
Sweezy]).  It didn’t, though as usual the economics and the politics shaped the details---
but did not determine the tide.  The left-institutionalist argument originates with Marx in 
1846: “Since 1825, the invention and use of machinery resulted solely from the war 
between masters and workmen.”12  The left can claim that this or that change of technique
—factories (Marglin) or mule spinning (Lazonick) or enclosure (Allen) was partly 
motivated by the share of the spoils, not efficiency.13  Lazonick summarized the program 
in his graceful presidential address to the Business History Conference in 1991: “For 
better or for worse, it has been the strategies of people entering into social relationship in 
attempts to control their lives that has shaped the markets for labor, capital, and products 
12   Marx 1846.  He continues, though, “but this is true only of England. As for the [Continental] 
European nations, they were compelled to use machinery by the competition they were 
encountering from the English,” which implies that the machinery was more efficient—which is 
the bourgeois point.  On the other hand, Lazonick argues in 
13   Marglin 1974; Lazonick 1979, 1981; Elbaum and Lazonick ;Elbaum and Lazonick, eds. 1986; 
Lorenz 1991; Allen 1992.
that have come to characterize the modern industrial world.”14  The idea is that 
organizations—unions, corporations, conspiracies, politics—run the show.
The left-wing and the Schumpeterian and the institutionalist critics of 
Samuelsonian economics often make their case well.  In the one example in which I too 
am a little knowledgeable, the English enclosures, the leftish Robert Allen agreed with me 
that the share of spoils mattered a good deal, and that the rise in productivity was 
anyway small (I did the scientific work in the 1970s when I was still an orthodox 
Samuelsonian/Friedmanite economist).15  But dividing up the spoils from efficiency gains
—one version of the organizational struggle that economists on the left from Marx to 
Galbraith have emphasized—was not mainly what made the modern world.  Nor was the 
modern world made by the “organizational capabilities” that Lazonick and Robert Reich 
and Lester Thurow and others emphasize.  The capability of the Americans to organize 
mass production or the capabilities of the Japanese to organize worker-management 
cooperation are in the long run imitable, and imitated.  And in the medium run they can 
become dis-capabilities, handicaps, when the economic environment that made them 
profitable changes.  Thus Henry Ford’s capability in mass production of tin lizzies 
became a handicap when faced by General Motors’ capability in annual model changes 
and in servicing a middle-class market.  The storied excellence of the Japanese of the 
1970s dissolved into the Lost Decade of the 1990s.  The Soviet capability in exploiting 
economies of industrial scale under central planning in the 1930s became the handicap of 
the 1980s.  The capability of British engineering in bespoke tailoring of railway 
14  Lazonick 1991, p. 2.
15  McCloskey 1975a; Allen 1992.
locomotives in the 1890s became the handicap of the 1960s. The shunning of defectors 
that enforced contracts among, for example, Jewish traders of North Africa in the Middle 
Ages became the handicap in early modern times of not sufficiently attending to courts.16
What made the modern world was the gigantic size of the entirely unprecedented 
spoils of innovation in product and process and organization, together with an egalitarian 
distribution of the spoils in the long run driven by entry and competition.  The inventor 
Richard Roberts, true, was directly employed by English cotton-textile manufacturers to 
produce a device to break the labor power of the mule spinners.  But most inventions 
achieved their profitability—as indeed the self-actor also did—by making costs lower for 
a given output, not by exploiting the workers (whether or not along the way the workers 
did get exploited).  Exploiting the workers, to repeat, does not yield enough loot to 
explain rises of 100 percent, not to speak of 1500 percent, in the productivity of all—
including paradoxically the exploited workers themselves.
Normal profits are earned not by exploitation but by alertness to the right way of 
doing business—running a store better than other people know how, say—and super-
normal profits are earned by superior alertness, such as Sam Walton of WalMart 
exhibited.  The piled-up alertnesses have made us rich.  The Astors and the Carnegies 
and Sam Waltons make the money in the first generation by alertness in the fur business 
or steel manufacturing or retail trade.  (And with an occasional but well-placed bribe, it 
must be admitted—but this is true of little capitalists, too, and is rampant in socialism; 
and in fact Carnegie and Rockefeller [and for all I know Sam Walton: I am sure about 
16  Thus Greif ***
Carnegie and Rockefeller] were by the standards of the time notably ethical in their 
dealings.)  Yet when everyone figures out how to get beaver hats or steel or close 
monitoring of retail inventories, the profit goes back to normal, and we, poor exploited 
things, are left with cheaper beaver hats and cheaper steel and retail goods 30 percent 
cheaper than charged by our good neighbors the local hardware and clothing 
monopolists on Main Street.
Works Cited
Allen, Robert C.  1992.  Enclosure and the Yeoman: The Agricultural Development of the South Midlands, 1450-1850.  Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.
Appleby, Joyce Oldham.  1978. Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England.  Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
DeLong, Bradford.  2007.  “Barry Ritholtz Does Not Seem to Understand the Purpose of ‘Core Inflation’."  At DeLong 
blog, Grasping Reality with Both Hands, http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2007/09/barry-ritholtz-.html
Desmet, Klaus, and Stephen Parente.  2009.  “The Evolution of Markets and the Revolution of Industry: A Quantitative 
Model of England's Development, 1300-2000.”   Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper, 
number 7290.  At http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7290&r=his
Elbaum, Bernard L., and William Lazonick, eds.  1986.  The Decline of the British Economy.    New York: Oxford 
University Press.
Goldstone, Jack A.  2002a.  “The Rise of the West—or Not?  A Revision to Socio-economic History.”  Sociological Theory 
18 (2): 175-194.  
Greif, Avner.  2006.  Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade.  Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Heston,  Alan.  2002.  "Review of Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century.  "  EH.Net Economic 
History Services, Aug 1.  http://eh.net/bookreviews/library/heston
Lazonick, William.  1979.  “Industrial Relations and Technical Change: The Case of the Self Actor Mule.”  Cambridge 
Journal of Economics  3 (Sept): 231-262.
Lazonick, William.  1981.  “Production Relations, Labor Productivity and Choice of Technique: British and US Cotton 
Spinning.”   Journal of Economic History  41: 491-516.
Lazonick, William.  1991.  “Business History and Economics.”  Business and Economic History,   2nd ser. 20.  At 
http://www.h-net.org/~business/bhcweb/publications/BEHprint/v020/p0001-p0013.pdf
Marglin, Stephen A.  1974.  “What Does Bosses Do?  The Origins and Functions of Hierarchy in Capitalist Production.” 
Part I.  Review of Radical Political Economics  6 (summer): 33-60; and Part II: 60-112.  Reprinted in A. Gorz, ed. 
The Division of Labour: The Labour Process and Class Struggle in Modern Capitalism  (Brighton, 1976) and as pp. 25-
68 in Warwick Organizational Behaviour Staff, eds.  Organizational Studies.   London: Routledge, 2001.
Marx, Karl.  1846.  “Letter [on Proudhon, in French] to Pavel Yasilyevich Annenkov.”  December 28, trans. Peter and 
Betty Ross, Marx Engels Collected Works Vol 38, p. 95, reproduced at http://www.marxists.org/archive/ 
marx/works/1846/letters/46_12_28.htm 
McCloskey, Deirdre N.  1972b.  “Review of Ramsey's The Price Revolution in 16th Century England,” Journal of Political  
Economy   80 (Nov/Dec, 1972): 1332-35.
McCloskey, Deirdre N.  1975a.  “The Economics of Enclosure: A Market Analysis.”  Pp. 123-160 in E. L. Jones and 
William Parker, eds.  European Peasants and Their Markets: Essays in Agrarian Economic History.   Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.
Perdue, Peter.  2005. China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia.   Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Ritholtz, Barry.  2007.  “Inflation: CPI, Core Rate, Inflation ex-Inflation.”  At Rotholtz blog Seeking Alpha, 
http://seekingalpha.com/article/ 48927-inflation-cpi-core-rate-inflation-ex-inflation
